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ABSTRACT
Over the past couple of decades Madagascar has witnessed an 
explosion in the number of primate species generally recog-
nized. Much of this proliferation can be traced less to increasing 
knowledge of the lemur fauna than to the complete replacement 
of biological notions of the species by the Phylogenetic Species 
Concept (PSC), which views species as irreducible diagnosable 
units. The consequent focus on autapomorphy (unique posses-
sion of morphological and molecular derived features) as ‘the’ 
criterion for species recognition has led to the almost complete 
disappearance of lemur subspecies from Madagascar faunal 
lists; yet subspecies are an expected result of the evolutionary 
forces that gave rise to the island’s current pattern of biodiver-
sity. Thanks in part to the perspective introduced by the PSC, it 
has become clear both that there is much more species - level 
diversity among Madagascar’s lemurs than was evident only 
a couple of decades ago, and that this diversity is much more 
complexly structured than we had thought. But it does not 
appear to be aptly reflected in the hard - line procedural adop-
tion of the PSC across the board, a move that typically results 
in fifty-percent inflation in species numbers relative to those 
yielded by biological concepts. I argue here that the reflexive 
wholesale application of the PSC to Madagascar’s lemurs is 
inappropriate from both systematic and conservation stand-
points, and that a return to biological species concepts, and to 
the corresponding criteria for species recognition, will allow us 
to attain a much fuller and more nuanced appreciation of lemur 
diversity at low taxonomic levels.
RÉSUMÉ
Depuis la fin du siècle dernier, nous avons été les témoins d’une 
explosion du nombre d’espèces de primates à Madagascar. 
Cette profusion découle cependant bien moins de l’évolution de 
nos connaissances sur les lémuriens que de la substitution des 
concepts biologiques de l’espèce par le Concept Phylogénétique 
de l’Espèce (CPE ou Phylogenetic Species Concept – PSC), ce 
dernier considérant l’espèce comme le plus petit groupe irré-
ductible d’organismes qui puisse être différencié d’un autre 
groupe. L’autapomorphie (c’est - à - dire la possession de cara-
ctères dérivés uniques, morphologiques et moléculaires) est 
ainsi devenue ‘le’ critère pour distinguer les espèces, de sorte 
que la quasi - totalité des sous - espèces de lémuriens ont dis-
paru des listes fauniques de Madagascar ; sachant cependant 
que les sous - espèces sont un résultat escompté des forces 
de l’évolution qui ont forgé la biodiversité que nous observons 
aujourd’hui sur l’île. Élever toutes les sous - espèces au rang 
d’espèces pour la simple raison qu’elles peuvent être diagnos-
tiquées revient à amputer la faune malgache du mécanisme 
que nous connaissons et qui est justement à l’origine de la 
fameuse diversité malgache à des niveaux taxinomiques infé-
rieurs. C’est en partie grâce à la perspective offerte par le CPE 
qu’il est devenu clair que la diversité des espèces de lémuriens 
de Madagascar était bien plus importante qu’on ne le pensait 
il y a encore quelques dizaines d’années, mais aussi que cette 
diversité avait une structure bien plus complexe que nous ne 
l’avions imaginée. Il semble cependant que dans l’ensemble, 
le CPE n’ait pas été adopté correctement dans sa procédure 
pure et dure, de sorte que nous assistons à une inflation de 
cinquante pourcent du nombre des espèces par rapport à celles 
qui sont révélées par les concepts biologiques. Je soutiens ici 
que l’application globale et réflexive du CPE aux lémuriens de 
Madagascar est inappropriée aussi bien du point de vue de la 
systématique que de la protection de la nature, et qu’un retour 
vers des concepts biologiques des espèces, et leurs critères 
inhérents à la reconnaissance des espèces, nous permettra de 
mieux appréhender la diversité des lémuriens avec les nuances 
nécessaires pour considérer les niveaux taxinomiques inféri-
eurs. Accepter que les espèces sont dynamiques mais aussi 
des entités historiquement individualisées plutôt que des unités 
typologiques définies par la seule présence de caractères 
dérivés uniques nous permettra d’y voir plus clair et de nous 
poser les bonnes questions afin d’appréhender la diversité et 
la complexité biologiques de Madagascar. 
INTRODUCTION
Madagascar’s biodiversity is legendary, although especially in 
the case of the island’s endemic mammals it bears a distinctly 
insular aspect, with rather few major taxa represented by an 
undeniable profusion of species. But just how great is that profu-
sion? The question is a deceptively simple one, for it involves 
not only notions of what species are in the abstract, but of how 
they may be operationally recognized. This is important; for, 
while everyone can agree that species are the basic “kinds” of 
organisms in the living world, opinions may legitimately differ 
on just how they are bounded, and even on how we can know 
those boundaries exist, and where they lie.
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By the mid - twentieth century most zoologists had moved 
beyond earlier typologies, and had come to embrace the Biologi-
cal Species Concept (BSC), in which the species was regarded 
as the largest effective reproducing population. Individuals 
resembled each other because they belonged to the same 
species, rather than vice versa (cf. Mayr 1982). Accordingly, 
this was largely an age of taxonomic inclusivity. The two major 
systematic overviews of Madagascar’s primates published in 
the 1970s and 1980s (Petter et al. 1977, Tattersall 1982) both 
hewed quite closely to Ernst Schwarz’s (1931) pioneering genus- 
and species - level revision of several decades earlier. Based 
entirely on the scrutiny of museum specimens, Schwarz had 
reduced the total number of lemur species to 20. Nine of these 
were polytypic, with a total of 26 subspecies among them. By 
the time I completed my own synthesis more than half a century 
later (Tattersall 1982), students of the lemur fauna enjoyed the 
considerable benefit of a growing corpus of field observations 
in addition to the museum collections. But, even so, I was still 
able to recognize only 22 species. Seven of these were polytypic, 
to a total of 29 subspecies.
So much for minimalism. Over the last two decades, the 
number of species - level lemur taxa has exploded. When Mitter-
meier et al. (1994) published the first edition of their field guide 
to the lemurs, which has by now achieved canonical status, 
they listed 31 lemur species. By the time the second edition 
(Mittermeier et al. 2006) was published a dozen years later, there 
were 68 species, plus some cryptic allusions to species as yet 
unnamed. And in the third edition (Mittermeier et al. 2010), 
issued after an interval of only four years, the number of lemur 
species had soared to 97. Now the total stands at well over 
100 (see Tattersall 2013). Significantly, the number of polytypic 
lemur species simultaneously underwent a marked decline: 
there were seven in 1994, but only two in 2006 and 2010.
SPECIES CONCEPTS, EVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES, AND
LEMURS. Hardly coincidentally, just as lemur species were 
burgeoning in Madagascar, the total number of different species 
concepts on offer in the literature was similarly mushroom-
ing. At last count (Coyne and Orr 2004, Hausdorf 2011) there 
were almost 30 such concepts. Most, however, fall into one 
of three classes. One large category consists of variants on 
the Biological Species Concept (BSC). A second contains 
Hugh Paterson’s (1985) Recognition Concept of Species (RCS), 
a significant contribution that emphasizes the importance 
of shared common fertilization systems. But the idea of the 
species that is most closely identified with the recent prolifera-
tion of lemur species in Madagascar falls into the third. This 
most importantly includes Joel Cracraft’s (1983) Phylogenetic 
Species Concept (PSC), a derivative of G. G. Simpson’s (1961) 
“evolutionary” notion of the species.
In what was probably his most influential single articula-
tion of the PSC, Cracraft (1983: 170) defined the species as “an 
irreducible cluster of organisms that is diagnosably distinct from 
other such clusters, and within which there is a parental pattern 
of ancestry and descent.” For operational as well as theoreti-
cal reasons, most subsequent practical applications of the PSC 
have tended to overlook the last part of this definition, and to 
focus instead solely upon the criterion of diagnosability (Tatter-
sall 2007). Where it has been applied in vertebrate systematics, 
the PSC has by one estimate led to a multiplication of species 
compared to the BSC of around 50 percent (Agapow et al. 2004).
The simplified focus on diagnosability is quite understand-
able, appealing as it does to the innately reductionist proclivi-
ties of the human mind. What’s more, on the operational level, 
narrowing the emphasis to this single criterion hugely simplifies 
the complex task of identifying species. Whether you are in the 
field, or in a museum, or in your laboratory, if you can recognize 
it, it’s a species. All it takes is one nice distinguishing feature 
to do the trick. Both in the forest and in the storage cabinet, 
favored species - group features of this kind have traditionally 
consisted of what we used to call ‘external’ characters, visible 
to the naked eye: pelage coloration, ear size, and so forth. 
Particularly in the case of cryptically - colored and mostly small-
bodied nocturnal primates, field workers have long also leaned 
upon vocal characteristics as species recognition criteria. And 
most recently, of course, the ultimate reductive weapon of DNA 
distance has been extensively deployed, albeit often via crude 
base-substitution counts at various marker positions, principally 
in the mitochondrial genome.
Hence the massive loss of lemur subspecies between 1982 
and 2010, as the PSC began to bite in strepsirhine systematics. Via 
the stringent application of the diagnosability criterion, virtually 
every subspecies out there was promoted to the species level. 
And while the investigators involved in this wholesale splitting 
may not always have been aware of it, this stratagem involved 
abandoning some very basic notions of evolutionary process. 
Under the BSC, successful and widely - distributed species had 
been actively expected to spawn subspecies: readily recog-
nizable local variants that were nonetheless reproductively 
compatible with their conspecifics living elsewhere. Indeed the 
BSC, and the corpus of evolutionary theory from which it was 
derived (basically, the New Synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s: 
see Mayr 1982), saw subspecies as the engines of biodiver-
sity, giving new species a place to start. Without subspecies, 
or at least differentiated populations, there could be no new 
species. And my contention here is that this simple proposition 
remains as valid now as it was twenty years ago, irrespective of 
whether (or not) you accept the well-substantiated proposition 
that speciation and morphological divergence are not simply 
different sides of the same coin (Tattersall 1994).
Saying this is not to deny the utility of the PSC perspec-
tive. Indeed, sophisticated applications of the approach in the 
systematics of a wide range of major taxa have permitted biolo-
gists (using both phenotypic and DNA criteria) to identify many 
cases in which unrelated but phenotypically similar populations 
had been incorrectly lumped under the same bio - species. As 
a result, most investigators nowadays would demand data of 
several different kinds to confirm claims of population status, 
whether specific or infraspecific. What is more, to acknowledge 
that subspecies exist as real entities, albeit elusive ones, also 
involves accepting that the living world is a messy place. Nature 
is not neatly packaged. At the lowest levels of the taxonomic 
hierarchy, where divergence is minimal, and where even taxa 
destined ultimately to be highly distinctive may be hard to 
differentiate from their sisters, demarcations are often blurry. 
Subspecies are, of course, diagnosable by definition. But even if 
future systematists will be able to look back and determine that 
diagnosably differentiated populations had in fact embarked on 
separate historical trajectories, prior to the critical (and prob-
ably usually fairly short-term) event of speciation the only barri-
ers to genetic interchange among conspecific populations will 
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be geographical ones. What is more, speciation itself is neither 
a simple process, nor even a unitary one. Indeed, there is a 
good argument to be made that it is not usefully referred to as a 
process at all. After all, to do so would be to imply the action of 
a specific mechanism (Tattersall 1986), whereas many different 
mechanisms may in fact be involved, acting at anywhere from 
the molecular to the population levels (Tattersall 1994).
As useful as it may be to think of speciation as an event that 
‘happens’ at a point in time, the reality is that this fundamental 
generator of biodiversity is something that we invariably infer 
in retrospect, and that we recognize only via its consequences. 
Such consequences most fundamentally involve the historical 
individualization of lineages (Ghiselin 1974), and the establish-
ment of the substantially impermeable reproductive barriers 
that such individualization suggests. What is more, it is not easily 
predictable just how those consequences will be expressed, 
nor even evident that they will be expressed in ways visible to 
the systematist. Closely related species may show consider-
able morphological divergence from one another, or they may 
show hardly any at all. This failure of newly - separated species 
to conform to an easily quantifiable pattern of morphological 
divergence not only argues strongly for the notion that specia-
tion is ‘not’ an ‘event’ of an inherently specifiable kind, but 
also for the parallel fact of life that a comprehensive definition 
of species – like the identification of a unitary ‘mechanism’ of 
speciation itself – will always remain out of reach.
Still, nobody would dispute that species-level taxa do exist 
in some meaningful way. Nature really is packaged, however 
untidily; and those boundaries actually are there, no matter how 
blurry or elusive they may be. It is, of course, because they 
accept this unavoidable reality that the advocates of the PSC 
so fervently desire some simple and effective operational way 
of recognizing species. Yet the simple fact is that nature does 
not always organize itself for the taxonomist’s convenience.
It is at this point that Paterson’s RCS enters the picture, 
with its focus upon how conspecifics mutually recognize that 
they belong to the same exclusive breeding pool. From Pater-
son’s perspective, the significant thing is that the subjects of 
our studies know perfectly well who they are, irrespective of 
how difficult it may be for us to ‘read their minds’ on the matter. 
Accordingly, he emphasized the importance in species recog-
nition of inter - individual signaling systems, whether vocal, or 
chemical, or behavioral, or visual (Paterson 1985). Sometimes 
candidate signaling systems may mislead human observers, 
as in Madagascar they evidently have done in the case of the 
several easily recognizable varieties assigned to the Eulemur 
fulvus group. By Mittermeier et al.’s (2010) last count, there are 
seven species in this group. All are differentiated by marked 
chromatic differences in the pelage, and some of them are 
additionally sexually dichromatic. They are certainly diagnos-
able, at least in terms of mean chromatic tendencies. But since 
almost all of these purported species readily and successfully 
interbreed when given the opportunity, and almost anyone who 
has wandered extensively in the forests of Madagascar has 
observed fulvus - group variants that defied ready classification, 
the distinguishing features that are so evident to us clearly have 
little to do with these lemurs’ own senses of identity. Similar 
observations also apply, if less dramatically, to certain other 
largish - bodied diurnal lemurs, such as some variants of the 
Propithecus verreauxi - group (e.g., King et al. 2012).
Different problems apply to the categorization of the 
typically smaller - bodied and more cryptically colored noctur-
nal forms. Between them, the two genera Microcebus and 
Lepilemur account for a large proportion of the recent increase 
in the number of lemur species: in 1982 there were two species 
of Microcebus and only one of Lepilemur (albeit with six subspe-
cies); while in 2010 the respective counts were 18 and 26, 
respectively. Most of these purported species have been diag-
nosed principally or purely on the basis of mtDNA distances, a 
procedure recently criticized on multiple grounds by Frankham 
et al. (2012). Even leaving aside these authors’ cogent tech-
nical objections, whether the mtDNA distances reported for 
Microcebus and Lepilemur samples actually correlate with other 
valid criteria for species recognition is in many cases unknown. 
This having been said, however, there is no doubt that there are 
many more species of both Microcebus and Lepilemur out there 
than I was able to recognize in 1982; and indeed, the existence 
and identities of some of those additional Microcebus species 
have already been quite convincingly demonstrated via the 
deployment of multiple criteria (e.g., Zimmermann et al. 1998, 
Rasoloarison et al. 2000, Yoder et al. 2002).
I have reviewed much of the evidence for taxonomic 
proliferation among the lemurs elsewhere (Tattersall 2007, 
2013). It does not seem particularly helpful to repeat this 
exercise here, except to note that in both contributions I 
concluded that fully individuated status cannot at present be 
considered conclusively substantiated for many more than half 
of the 100-odd lemur species listed in the latest Field Guide 
(Mittermeier et al. 2010). Still, I would also emphasize that, in 
pointing to a paucity of decisive evidence for some of the more 
extravagant estimates of lemur species numbers, I am not in 
the least disputing that there is far more lemur biodiversity in 
the forests of Madagascar than we had thought there was only 
four decades ago. Clearly, there are many species and distinc-
tive populations of lemurs in those forests, some of them with 
highly limited distributions. Equally evidently, the remarkable 
diversity of Malagasy primates is systematically, geographically, 
genetically, morphologically and ecologically structured in a 
much more complex fashion than we had ever dreamed, even 
as recently as at the beginning of this millennium.
However, I do urge the exercise of caution in using the crite-
rion of diagnosability as the sole arbiter of species status, whether 
the diagnostic evidence at hand is molecular, or morphological, 
or vocal, or whatever. Diagnosability is certainly a major factor 
to be taken into account in any alpha - taxonomic decision; but 
using this criterion alone, as the PSC in its currently fashionable 
form advocates, simply takes us back to the phenetic cacophony 
of species from which Ernst Schwarz (1930) rescued us the best 
part of a century ago. In order to determine with any confidence 
whether or not our subject populations ‘behave’ as individuated 
entities – which should surely be our goal – we require evidence 
from multiple sources, including morphology (in its broadest 
sense, embracing superficial characters and olfactory signal-
ing systems as well as internal anatomy), DNA markers, social 
behaviors, vocal and visual communication, geographical and 
ecological distributions, environmental preferences, and inter-
actions with sympatric populations including putative gene flow.
We are obliged, in other words, to proceed in the manner of 
many judicial systems, also operating in a complex and murky 
world, in which decisions are reached on a preponderance of 
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the evidence. Still, we have to be careful with our metaphors; 
and the familiar criterion of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ used in 
criminal cases may be a little too stringent for some real - world 
biological data sets. We might more appropriately look to civil 
law, in which more general probabilities apply. Much as tidy-
minded systematists might wish they were not, very closely 
related species are often genetically leaky vessels, which means 
that reasonable doubt as to individuation can in some cases be 
very difficult to banish. As a systematist, I would instinctively 
prefer in those cases to apply the presumption of innocence, 
and to regard sister populations as conspecific unless there 
are compelling reasons to conclude otherwise. But it is also 
apparent that from a conservation standpoint the evidence 
might be interpreted differently, particularly where distinctive 
and highly localized populations are imperfectly known; and 
clearly, in an arena as complex and nuanced as this, a ‘one size 
fits all’ solution is never going to apply. As in the law, a judicious 
case - by - case approach is indicated.
Still, the reasons for adopting a restrained general attitude 
toward species recognition are compelling; and they relate not 
simply to the multifaceted nature of species as reflected in 
the plethora of definitions available, but to the nature of the 
evolutionary process that produced the diversity we see in 
Madagascar today. For there is every reason to believe that, far 
from being some kind of passive relict that in isolation long ago 
established an equilibrium with its environment, the Malagasy 
biota is, instead, in a dynamic state of evolutionary flux (cf. 
contributions in Goodman and Benstead 2003). This is perhaps 
more than ever the case since the recent elimination of the 
island’s megafauna.
Above the level of the genome, the fixation of heritable 
novelties in local populations belonging to existing species is 
the most fundamental process involved in generating biodiver-
sity. This process is synonymous with the formation of those 
diagnosable variants we call subspecies. And it is an essential 
part of the evolutionary dynamic. To promote all subspecies to 
species simply on the grounds that they are diagnosable is to 
rob the Malagasy fauna of the very mechanism that we know 
must have operated to produce the island’s famous diversity at 
low taxonomic levels. 
CONSERVATION AND SPECIES. So, what does all this imply for 
conservation? People concerned with protecting the 
whole environment at particular places on the planet’s surface 
– which, captive propagation of individual species aside, is all 
that can be effectively done in this arena – often get rather 
impatient at what they see as the quibbling of taxonomists, who 
peddle an inherently unstable product. Their attitude is often 
a pragmatic “let’s just have a set of names that everyone can 
agree on, so we can get on with protecting what we know is 
there anyway.” Even taxonomists can sympathize with such 
sentiments; and it is unfortunate indeed that their subjects, as 
the products of complex and untidy evolutionary processes, 
do not always compress easily within neat species boundaries. 
But regrettable as it may be, this messy reality is also unavoid-
able – even though, because of their understandable frustra-
tion, those involved in conservation seem at times to have 
felt impelled to import their own imperatives into taxonomy.
If a species occurs uniquely at a particular site, that site 
might rise in the priority list for protection; and certainly in 
purely pragmatic terms it might be easier to raise funds for 
a particular locality possessing its own ‘flagship’ species. A 
conservationist might well be tempted to believe that, if this 
perceived advantage has to be gained by promoting what had 
previously been a subspecies to full species status, then so 
be it. But then again, if that advantage were to come at the 
expense of other sites depending on the same funding pool, 
local conservation gain of this kind might actually lead to a 
misallocation of resources on a wider scale. What is more, 
viewing species as irreducible units might in fact produce 
defined species populations that are simply too small to be 
viable in the long term: something that for many reasons is, at 
the very least, unfortunate from a conservation perspective. 
From the taxonomist’s point of view, of course, this approach 
might also lead to pressure for a biologically unsubstantiated 
proliferation of names, as one suspects may to some extent 
have happened in Madagascar.
Fortunately, there is an alternative conservationist view of 
taxonomy, one strongly advocated recently by Richard Frankham 
and colleagues (Frankham et al. 2012). These authors argue that, 
for conservation purposes, the “substantial reproductive isola-
tion” required by the Differential Fitness Species Concept (DFSC: 
Hausdorf 2011) is greatly preferable to the diagnosability of the 
Phylogenetic Species Concept. Operationally the DFSC, which 
is effectively an extension of the Biological Species Concept 
(BSC), is more demanding than pure diagnosability, since at 
least in the form advocated by Frankham et al. (2012) it requires 
quite extensive genetic sampling (looking widely for a dearth 
of shared alleles at one or more autosomal loci as indicators 
of a lack of gene flow). But it produces species groupings that 
are more practical to conserve because they will have larger 
effective population sizes, and presumably wider distributions. 
What is more, recognizing species according to the admittedly 
rather imprecise criterion of substantial genetic isolation will, 
the authors claim, facilitate “genetic rescue efforts … and [when 
populations are crossed] the risk of outbreeding depression [will 
be] minimized” (Frankham et al. 2012: 30). And from a systema-
tist’s point of view, this approach also has the advantage of 
taking into account Nature’s blurry lines.
It is true that the information necessary for applying the 
DFSC will not always be available. But Frankham et al. (2012) 
also make a persuasive more general case for applying the prin-
ciples of the BSC, rather than those of the PSC, for conservation 
purposes. And they very wisely insist that any species listing 
or classification be accompanied by an explicit statement of 
the species concept from which it was derived. Crucially, their 
conservation-oriented recommendations have the additional 
advantage that they should also be entirely acceptable to any 
taxonomist who is aware of the complexities of the multi-level 
evolutionary process(es). If there is one thing we can certainly 
all agree upon, it is that descent with modification is the only 
hypothesis we have that predicts the observed organization of 
biological diversity we find in Madagascar and elsewhere, both 
at lower and higher levels of the taxonomic hierarchy. And if we 
deny that species may be polytypic, we shall starve evolution 
of its most basic component, namely population differentiation.
The bottom line here is that we do not need to gild the lily 
of Madagascar’s altogether remarkable biodiversity by maximiz-
ing the possible number of its species. After all, even on the 
most conservative estimates of species numbers, this unique 
diversity is already impressive enough to place the island at 
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the forefront of conservationist awareness. To put the matter 
another way, more is not necessarily better. In fact, in the long 
run an unnecessary multiplicity of species will almost certainly 
complicate the conservation enterprise.
Yes, there is without doubt an enormous amount of biologi-
cal diversity and ecological complexity out there in the forests of 
Madagascar: a diversity that requires not only to be recognized, 
but to be appropriately categorized. There can be no doubt 
that those who have applied the criterion of diagnosability to 
the recognition of species in the Malagasy primate fauna have 
performed a salutary service, in drawing attention to the amaz-
ing extent of this diversity and complexity. But the effort to 
understand the multi - level population dynamics involved will 
not be well served by simply imprisoning the actors in Mada-
gascar’s evolutionary play within an irreducible number of 
pigeonholes. There is clearly a lot more going on in the Malagasy 
biosphere than this static view would suggest. Accepting that 
species are dynamic but historically individuated entities, rather 
than typological units defined by their possession of uniquely 
derived characters, will free our minds to clarify this complexity. 
It will help us to ask the right questions.
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